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Scope and Limitations
THIS book records the behavior of wages in Germany from 1871 to
1945—the period during which the Reich existed as a political unit.
These were fateful years, beginning with the foundation of the Reich
and ending with its collapse and partition. They embrace periods of
peace and war; of growth and stagnation; of inflation and deflation; of
monarchical, democratic, and totalitarian regimes; of free and controlled
labor markets. The aim of this study has been to analyze wage behavior,
under these unusually varied conditions, in all its major aspects—trends
and cycles in wage rates and earnings, in money wages and real wages,
in wage levels and in wage differentials.
The broad scope of this investigation required the study of an unusual
amount of source material. The chief statistical sources were published
official and private compilations of time series. On occasion, particularly
for the early years, it was necessary to go back to crumbling periodicals.
And sometimes wage series or composite indexes could only be put
together from bits and pieces. Most of the basic data and all of the derived
series are presented here. In addition to quantitative data, the investigation
drew upon a wealth of qualitative material—descriptions of wage setting,
trade union activity, the role of employers' organizations, apprenticeship
agreements, and the like.
Some limits must necessarily be set to a study of this sort. Hence,
there are several aspects of wage behavior that might appear pertinent
to our inquiry but could not be dealt with. What, for instance, were the
effects—on wage levels and on wage structure—of differences in size of
establishment, degree of fixed capital investment, variations in pro-
ductivity, extent of carteiization, relative strength of union organization,
length of training period, social status of occupations? How would wage
trends change if adjustments were made for emoluments in kind, paid
vacations, and other fringe benefits to which monetary values might be
assigned? Analysis of problems such as these would require more detailed
information than could be secured and more complex designs of research
than the investigation permitted.
The reader will note that this study is organized not by historical
periods but by topics such as wage trends, wage structure, and cyclical
fluctuations. An arrangement of this sort seemed preferable for a syste-
matic analysis of economic relationships. However, during extraordinary
periods, such as the two world wars or the Great Inflation, rapid institu-
tional changes loom so large in the wage picture that analytic description
of wage behavior must of necessity become historical. A separate chapter,
therefore, is reserved for a description of these unusual events. Finally,
wage behavior in Germany was compared with that in two other countries,
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Great Britain and the United States, in order to determine to what extent
the findings reflect specifically German circumstances and to what
extent more general experience.
Summary of Findings
TRENDS IN WAGE LEVELS
Over the three-quarters of a century under review, hourly earnings in
Germany increased about fourfold, weekly earnings about threefold.
The difference is attributable mainly to the decline in working hours—one
of the great economic and cultural consequences of modern technology.
Between the foundation of the Reich and the establishment of the Weimar
Republic the workweek was reduced from around 70 to about 48 hours.
Despite interruptions by war and inflation, the long-term upward trend
of money wages was remarkably steady.
Although wage trends are affected by price changes, they are not fully
explained by them. In contrast to the persistent rise of money wages,
wholesale prices underwent two huge cycles during the history of the
Reich, reaching similar levels in 1871, 1913, and 1944. Living costs also
rose, but for the period as a whole their increase was milder than that of
wages. The relation between the two measures is reflected in the move-
ments of real wages.
Hourly real earnings roughly doubled during the history of the Reich,
whereas weekly real earnings increased about 50 percent. If allowance be
made for taxes and social insurance contributions, the rise of weekly
real disposable or real net earnings may amount to only about one-third
between 1871 and 1944. This is, of course, quite different from the
trebling of weekly money earnings. An interesting and important aspect
of real wage behavior is the break in trend around the turn of the century.
The weekly real earnings of 1900 were not significantly exceeded until
about 30 years later, and then only by a few percent during the three years
centering around the 1929 peak in general business activity. The leveling
out of weekly real earnings after 1900 and up to 1913 is to be explained by
a particularly rapid rise in the prices of consumers' goods, coupled with
a continuing decline in the length of the workweek. The low levels of real
wages during the interwar period are to be understood in terms of a
further decline in hours of work and the general deterioration of economic
conditions during the years following World War I and the Great Inflation.
A close relation of real wages to general economic conditions can be
observed throughout German wage history. Taking per capita industrial
production as a rough measure of economic activity, we find closely
parallel developments of output and real wages. The steady growth of the
economy before World War I, the dismal circumstances that obtained
during the war and the inflation, the ups and downs during the remainingINTRODUCTION 5
yearsof the Weimar Republic, the recovery and later collapse under the
NationalSocialist regime—all these developments areconsistently
reflected in the behavior of both production and real earnings. The pa-allel
is not always perfect—the differences in the patterns are as illuminating
as the similarities—but on the whole trends of real wages are closely
bound to those of output.
THE STRUCTURE OF WAGES
Wages for different categories of workers varied within relatively narrow
bounds—certainly in comparison to the almost limitless range of prices
for commodities and services. Furthermore, the long-term trends of
individual wage series are more similar, one to another, than are the
trends of product prices. The wage structure, therefore, is considerably
more stable over time than the price structure. Both the high degree of
homogeneity and the greater stability of wages, as compared to product
prices, stem from basic differences between labor and commodities. In
broadest terms, the services provided by human beings are more similar,
industrially more interchangeable, more equally affected by changes in
technology, productivity, reproduction costs, and market demand, than
are inanimate goods.
Despite the marked similarity of the trends of wages, there were distinct
long-term changes in the structure of wages—changes which, on the whole,
tended to diminish inequalities among workers of varying characteristics.
This can be observed clearly enough in the decline of skill, age, sex, and
regional differentials. A similar, though not so striking, tendency can be
discerned with regard to city-size and industrial differentials.
Many factors, such as education, mechanization, and the regional
spread of industrialization, could be cited to explain the lessening of one
or another differential. But these special factors would hardly account
for the pervasiveness of the trend. The process of equalizing wages must
be understood in more general terms—as a concomitant of industrialism
itself. Perhaps, in mass-producing goods and distributing them over wide
areas, in fostering industrial organization, in spreading information,
and in providing education—in doing all this, modern industrialism
serves as a leveler. In spite of increasing occupational specialization,
differences become less important between individual working capacities,
between living standards, and between living costs of workers in different
industries, cities, or regions. It is this increasing homogeneity of socio-
economic and cultural conditions that may go far to explain the narrowing
of wage differentials.
CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
In the analysis of the cyclical behavior of wages a clear distinction must
be drawn between (1) wage rates—the prices paid per unit of working
time or output; and (2) earnings—which include premium payments6 iNTRODUCTION
for overtime, night and holiday work, and, in the case of weekly earnings,
reflect also variations in straight-time hours.
German. money wage rates showed only two substantial declines.
One occurred in the 1870's, during the severe business contraction that
followed the Gründerjahre boom, the other during the Great Depression.
To be sure, wage rate responses to business contractions took other
forms—retardation in rate of growth, stagnation, or slight decline. If
all these responses are counted, we find that wage rates conformed fairly
well to major cyclical changes in general business conditions. Nevertheless,
the rarity and the minor extent of the actual declines suggest a pronounced
downward rigidity of German wage rates.
Whenever wage rates responded to cyclical changes in business con-
ditions, they did so with considerable delay. This lag in timing, both at
peaks and at troughs, stands out as one of the most characteristic features
of the behavior of German wage rates. Moreover, the tendency to lag
is found even when wage rates respond strongly. The business cycle
peak preceding the Great Depression, for instance, occurred in April
1929, but union wage rates did not actually decline until December
1930—fully 20 months later. It is true that these rates had stopped in-
creasing somewhat earlier, but even if the first month of the resultant
wage plateau is regarded as a "turning point," the lag still amounts to
13 months.
The cyclical behavior of earnings was quite different from that of
rates.Earnings—andparticularlyweeklyearnings—showedcloser
conformity to business cycles, larger fluctuations, and less pronounced
lags after turning points. With the exception of wage rates, most of the
factors governing the behavior of earnings responded promptly and
consistently to changes in general business conditions.
As for real wages, several aspects of their cyclical behavior are of
interest. The downward rigidity and delayed response of money wage
rates, in conjunction with the cyclically more responsive living costs,
frequently led to increases of real wage rates during declines in general
business activity. This happened, for instance, during the Great Depression.
And the actual specific declines of real wages—whether rates or earnings—
were characteristically mild. Thus, in weekly real earnings (the most
responsive real wage measure) during 1929-32 (the most severe of the
business contractions), we find that the decline, measured on an annual
basis, amounted to only 15 percent.
With regard to the timing of cyclical turns, real wage rates show even
more protracted delays than money wage rates. They lagged after the 1929
peak by at least 21 months and perhaps as long as 32—depending on the
choice of turning points. An extreme delay occurred also at the terminal
trough of the Great Depression. This instance, however, reflects the
unusual labor market conditionsthat prevailed in Germany from
1933 on.INTRODUCTION 7
WAR AND INFLATION
World War I. The labor-market pressures that developed in the course
of that war brought about radical changes in wages. Money earnings,
on the average, roughly doubled during the brief span of four years;
real earnings decreased by about a third. More important, perhaps,
than the changes in wage levels was the upheaval in the wage structure.
In general, wages of women increased more than those of men. Workers
in war industries gained much more than those employed in civilian jobs.
People who worked on piece rates fared far better than those on time rates.
And workers in major industrial centers commanded larger wage increases
than those in rural communities. These circumstances led in some cases
to a narrowing, in others to a widening, of wage differentials. Whatever
the net effect of the widely divergent trends on the wage structure as a
whole, a most important consequence was the emergence of enormous
inequities in the pay of German workers. The government took some
steps to mitigate extreme hardship by adjusting wage rates to marital status
and number of dependents. But the basic disparities remained, contri-
buting to the social unrest which led to the overthrow of the Kaiserreich
and the establishment of the Weimar Republic.
The Great Inflation. The development of democratic institutions was
not followed at once by economic prosperity. The currency depreciation,
which continued wartime trends and culminated in the hyper-inflation
of 1922-23, created well-nigh incredible conditions in the economy as a
whole and in the labor market in particular. Money wages, between 1913
and the end of 1923, increased a trillion times, but even this astronomical
rise was appreciably less than that of living costs. Thus, during 1922 and
1923 weekly real wages sank so low that they amounted to only one-
half or two-thirds of the levels attained in 1913.
Real wages, moreover, were subject to extreme and erratic fluctuations.
Wage determination became a highly complex matter, as attempts were
made to gear wages to the rapid pace of currency depreciation. A special
"express" index of living costs soon failed to provide information fast
enough to implement current payroll calculations, and employers had to
pay their workers on the basis of the dollar exchange rate or the quotation
of a specific commodity price. They were compelled, furthermore, to make
wage payments several times a week, and frequently with emergency
money when the government printing presses fell behind the clamor for
currency.Sometimes part of the wages were paid in kind. The upshot of
this confusing jumble of price changes, payroll calculations, and methods
of disbursement was an unprecedented instability of realwages. For skilled
workers in the wood products industry, for instance, real wages in October
of 1923 were 25 percent of 1913 levels, in November of the same year 58
percent, and in December 72 percent.
The inflation had drastic effects not only on money and real wage8 INTRODUCTION
levels, but also on the wage structure. Perhaps the most dramatic change
it brought about was the virtual disappearance of skill differentials. For
eight industries these differentials—measured as differences between
wage rates of skilled and unskilled workers expressed in percent of the
former—averaged about 30 percent before World War I; during a few
months in 1922-23 they shrank to about 9 percent. Skill differentials in
building, about 22 percent before the war, amounted to only 4 percent in
April 1922. This phenomenon was brought about by the granting of equal
cost-of-living adjustments, in terms of marks and pfennigs, to both skilled
and unskilled workers. Such adjustments were intended to protect the
lower-paid worker against the hazards of hunger and cold.
National Socialism and World War II. Wages under the totalitarian
regime were strictly controlled, and their behavior deviated sharply from
that observable during comparable periods of expanding economic activity.
The government stabilized money-wage rates at their very lowest depres-
sion level, and permitted an increase of only 3 percent between 1933 and
1944. In view of a 60 percent rise in employment during the same period,
this stability of wage rates is without parallel in German history.
Wage stabilization was possible only as an integral part of price control.
However, Nazi price management permitted living costs to inch up
gradually, so that hourly real wage rates in 1939 were 6 percent below the
depression levels of 1932, and in 1944 about 15 percent below.
Workers managed to exceed their depression incomes by working
longer and harder. Weekly money earnings between 1932 and 1939 went
up by about 30 percent, between 1932 and 1944 by close to 45 percent.
After changes in living costs, taxes, and social insurance contributions
are taken into account, the increases in weekly real earnings between 1932
and 1939 amounted to less than 20 percent, and between 1932 and 1944
to less than 15 percent. Although computations of real wages for periods
of war are far from reliable, it is certain that the National Socialist regime
was able to prevent both an extreme rise of money earnings and an extreme
deterioration of real earnings.
The impact of wage controls on age, skill, sex, regional, city-size,
and industrial differentials was moderate. However, confronted as they
were by enormous manpower requirements, the Nazis employed a large
number of irregular workers, at rates sharply distinguished from those paid
to the regular work force. Agricultural and domestic service for boys and
girls, as well as compulsory harvest work for school children and fur-
loughed soldiers—furloughed to do farm work—helped to enlarge the
domestic labor force. Quantitatively more important was the impressment
of foreign workers, a total of about 9 million persons at the beginning of
1944. At that time every fourth worker in Germany was a foreigner.
The remuneration of these workers was lower than that of German
nationals, and ranged widely, in accordance with ethnic origin and
depending upon the status of the worker as "civilian" or "war prisoner."INTRODUCTION 9
For example, a Russian civilian worker earned about one-third of the
wages of a German worker. As a prisoner of war, a Russian received
40 pfennigs per day; this was less than half the allowance paid to prisoners
from the most favored enemy countries.
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
The findings on German wages have been compared with similar findings
for Great Britain and the United States in order to distinguish "specifically
German" from "typical" wage behavior.
Trends in wage levels for the three countries are indicated in Charts 33
to 38. For Germany and the United States, the lines are based on earnings,
whereas for Great Britain only wage rates are available. The marked
long-term increase of money wages in Germany had obvious counter-
parts in the other two countries. German hourly wages during the seventy-
three years rose about fourfold; the rise in Great Britain was as steep;
and the increase in the United States sevenfold (Chart 33). The steadiness
of the upward trend also is common to all three countries: after inter-
ruptions by wars or by major cyclical swings, the old trends tended to
become re-established. Finally, the milder rise of weekly wages is shared
by all three countries (Chart 34), since a material reduction of working
hours was characteristic of industrialized nations.
The first major differences among national long-term trends appear in
real wages, hourly and weekly (Charts 37 and 38). In the period as a
whole, hourly real wages in Germany and Great Britain approximately
doubled, those in the United States well-nigh quintupled. The comparative
picture for the years before 1913 varies from that for subsequent years.
Before World War I, the net increase in German and British real wages
came fairly close to that of wages in the United States. After World War I,
real wages in the United States outpaced by far those of Germany and
Great Britain.
A trend toward equalization of the wage structure has been noted as a
major characteristic of German wage history. The findings of British and
American students indicate similar trends in the two English-speaking
countries. In the case of skill differentials, for instance, we find, over the
period as a whole, a distinct narrowing of the gap between the wages of
skilled and unskilled workers in the three countries.
As to cyclical behavior, the outstanding features of German wage rates
were the rarity of marked declines and a tendency of wage rates to lag
substantially behind turns in general business conditions. Both these
traits apply also to wage rates in Great Britain and the United States.
Moreover, the occurrence of countercyclical increases of realrates
during business contractions and the still more retarded response of
real, as compared to money, wage rates are observable for all three
countries.
In general, both conformity and amplitude are more pronounced in10 INTRODUCTION
earnings than in wage rates. In Germany hourly rates tended to decline
least, hourly earnings somewhat more, weekly earnings most. Also, in the
United States and Great Britain, the fluctuations of weekly earnings were
larger than those of hourly earnings. Furthermore, the amplitudes of both
rates and earnings are roughly similar in magnitude. On the whole, it can
be said that the cyclical characteristics of wages—rates and earnings,
money wages and real wages—are strikingly similar in the three industrial
countries.
Of the unusual events through which the German economy passed,
the two most obviously "shared" by the other nations are the world
wars. During World War I money wages and real wages reflected the
economic and military fortunes of each country. Money wage rises and
real wage declines were extreme in Germany, which entered the war first,
was closest to the battlefields, suffered the greatest damage to its industrial
apparatus, and lost the war. By contrast, the United States experienced
the smallest rise in money wages, but a considerable gain in real
wages.
Comparison of wage behavior between the two world wars again
points up the general finding that wage levels reflect broad social and
economic conditions. We observe the same real wage pattern in the second
as in the first war—with Germany in the worst position, and the United
States in the most advantageous. Furthermore, real wage trends in all
three countries were more favorable during World War II than during the
earlier struggle. Apparently the intensive utilization of resources, spurred
by the war effort, permits modern industrial nations to wage war without
seriously lowering the living standards of their civilian workers.
Implications of the Study
Findings on the behavior of wages lend themselves to varied applications.
They may be used to test past and current generalizations. They may
contribute to an understanding of doctrine and to the resolution of
controversy. And they may influence wage policies of government and
decisions of management or labor.
According to certain wage doctrines, earnings are determined by a
fixed wage fund and the size of the labor force; real wages are bound
to stay close to subsistence levels; capitalism tends to bring about a
deterioration of real wages; differentials will increase as between wages
received by the mass of workers and those paid to a "labor aristocracy";
total wage income tends to form a decreasing share of national income;
money wages and real wages move cyclically in opposite directions; real
wage declines are a prerequisite to cyclical revivals; and so forth. The
findings of this study should be helpful for an appraisal of generalizations
of this sort.
A record of actual wage behavior may apply to wage theory in otheriNTRODUCTION 11
ways. Th.e propositions of wage theory usually reflect experiences of the
period in which they were formulated. Mercantilists and physiocrats,
writing during the preindustrial era of low productivity and low wage
levels, adhered to rigid subsistence theories. The development of steam-
engine industrialism at first brought, on the whole, little improvement
and, at times, severe deterioration in wages and working conditions;
hence the retention of but slightly modified subsistence ideas by the
classical economists, and the exploitation doctrines of Marx and other
critics. Later, with the startling technological advances, the increasing use
of laborsaving machinery, and the substantial gains in real wages, wage
theorists began to concentrate on problems of marginal productivity.
As labor organizations grew in importance and government came to play
an ever larger role in wage determination, wage doctrine increasingly
emphasized the role of bargaining power. Any extended exploration of
such relationships would have no place in a predominantly empirical.
study. Howevei, students of wage theory may find the present account of
some value for their work.
Finally, there are practical implications. Although the historical record
cannot possibly indicate that a particular wage policy is in general superior
to another, findings on wage behavior have wide applications in the field
of action. Consider, for instance, the long lags and the limited downward
flexibility of wage rates during business cycles; the consistency in the
long-term upward trend of money wages and real wages; the typical
relation of wages and living costs during pronounced inflations; the wild
disparities in "free" wage developments during catastrophes like wars;
the tendency toward decreasing skill or regional differentials. These
observed characteristics should bear on cost predictions, plant design,
long-term investment decisions, labor-management negotiations, and
government wage policies—if there is any relation between the progress
of economics and economic progress.
A Postscript on Recent Years
Most of this book deals with the years during which the German Reich
existed as a political unit. That period ended in 1945. Now, more than a
dozen years after the end of World War II, one can gain some impression
of wage developments under the new economic and political conditions.
Let us see to what extent the general characteristics of wage behavior
found for the earlier period are also apparent in recent years—and
conversely, to what extent recent developments may require qualification
of the broad generalizations on wage behavior culled from German
wage history. This brief inquiry is confined to the German Federal
Republic (West Germany). Some basic data on wage movements, prices,
production, employment and average weekly hours are provided for
reference in Appendix Table A-54.12 INTRODUCTION
LONG-TERM TRENDS
Money wages and real wages, be they hourly or weekly earnings, rose
steadily after 1947. If we accept the official measure of consumers' goods
prices, then real wages through 1949 remained under prewar levels; in
1950—two years after the currency reform and the first year with a normal
workweek and reasonably high production—they reached their 1938
standing; and after 1950 they advanced with the general recovery of the
economy. Rough comparisons show real earnings in 1958 to be about
forty-five to fifty-five percent above 1938. If we compare wage levels
reached in the past few years with the trends prevailing throughout the
history of the Reich we find them well in line. The broad secular trends of
rising money wages and real wages, hourly and weekly, continued in
recent years.
SKILL AND SEX DIFFERENTIALS
Some broad historical tendencies toward equalization of the wage structure
appear to be still operative during the postwar years. Skill differentials
continued to decline. The gap between average hourly earnings of un-
skilled men and earnings of all male workers was 19 percent of the latter
in 1938, 16 percent in 1947, and 14 percent in 1958. For women workers,
no pronounced trend in skill differentials was found during the postwar
period. Sex differentials between hourly earnings of all workers also
decreased, in continuation of long-term historical experience. In 1938
the earnings gap was 42 percent; in 1958 it had shrunk to 36 percent.
However the decline in sex differentials was concentrated in the group of
skilled workers. For unskilled workers, the sex differential widened in
fact between 1938 and the present.
REGIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL DIFFERENTIALS
The evidence shows a long-term trend toward decline of regional dif-
ferentials in the German Reich. Whether regional inequality of wages has
diminished, during recent years, in the territory now covered by West
Germany cannot be readily ascertained. But since the area covered by East
Germany consists of former low-wage territory, regional inequality of
wages within the Federal German Republic is presumably smaller than
in the prewar Reich. Finally, a word on industrial differentials. Between
1938 and 1958, wages in low-earnings industries tended to experience
considerably steeper percentage gains than wages inhigh-earnings
industries, indicating a diminished inequality between the extremes of the
industrial wage structure.
CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
During the postwar recovery years 1946-58, there were no marked cyclical
downturns in Germany's economic activity. As Appendix Table A-54INTRODUCTION 13
shows, neither production nor employment declined, at least not on an
annual basis. Between 1949 and 1950 we witness an increase in unemploy-
ment (somewhat boosted by an influx of East German refugees and a
general recovery of labor-force participation) and mild declines in whole-
sale and retail prices. These declines are not reflected in any downturn
of money or real earnings—an experience well in keeping with wage
behavior in the past.
Altogether, we find that the general characteristics of wage behavior
under the German Reich have persisted during recent years—a rising
trend of money and real wages, a diminishing inequality in the wage
structure, and an imperviousness of wage behavior to mild declines in
prices or rises in unemployment. Indeed, the major characteristics of
recent wage behavior in Germany could have been approximated quite
effectively, on the basis of historical evidence.